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THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE HOLY SEE AND ISRAEL AND THE
CONVENTIONS BETWEEN STATES AND THE
CHURCH SINCE THE VATICAN II COUNCIL
Silvio Ferrari*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the conclusion of the Vatican II Council, the Holy See has signed

more than sixty conventions of various titles with twenty-seven different
countries. Most of these have been with European and Latin American
countries where Catholicism, or at least Christianity, has had, and con-

tinues to have, considerable influence. One convention was signed with
the Muslim state of Morocco, another with Israel, and one with a very
specific scope with the Ivory Coast.
Many of these conventions regard particular, though sometimes very
important questions such as the appointment of bishops, the definition of
diocese boundaries, and religious assistance to the armed forces. About
ten conventions2 contain a general, or at least broad, regulatory discipline
* Professor, Ecclesiastical Law, University of Milan.
1.

Cf. 3 CARLOS CORRAL SALVADOR & SANTIAGO PETSCHEN, CONCORDATOS

VIGENTES: TExTOS ORIGINALES, TRADUCCIONES E INTRODUCCIONES (1981-1995)
(1996).
2. I refer to the following conventions: Accord Between the Holy See and Croatia
on Legal Questions (1996) (on file with author); Fundamental Agreement Between the
Holy See and the State of Israel, Dec. 30, 1993, Vatican-Isr., 33 I.L.M. 153 (1994) [hereinafter Fundamental Agreement]; Accord Between the Holy See and the Republic of San
Marino, Apr. 2, 1992, 85 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 324 (1993); Convention Between the
Holy See and the Republic of Malta Concerning Catholic Schools, Nov. 28, 1991, 85 ACTA
APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 569 (1993); Convention Between the Holy See and the Republic of
Malta Concerning Immovable Church Property, Nov. 28, 1991, 85 ACTA APOSTOLICAE
SEDIs 588 (1993); Agreement to Amend the 1929 Lateran Concordat, Feb. 18, 1984, Holy
See-Italy, 24 I.L.M. 1589 (1985); Letter from Pope John Paul I to King Hassan II of Morocco, Feb. 5, 1984, 76 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 712 (1984); Letter from King Hassan II
of Morocco to Pope John Paul II, Dec. 30, 1983, 76 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 712
(1984); Accord Between the Holy See and the Republic of Peru, July 19, 1980, 72 ACTA
APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 807 (1980); Instrumento de Ratificaci6n de 4 de diciembre de 1979,
Acuerdo Entre el Estado Espafiol y la Santa Sede, Sobre Asistencia Religiosa a las Fuerzas Armadas y servicio Militar de Cl~rigos y Religiosos de 3 de enero de 1979 (B.O.E.
1979, 300) [Accord Between Spain and the Holy See concerning Religious Assistance to
the Armed Forces and the Military Assistance of Clergy and Religious Persons]; Instru-
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concerning church-state relations. Because the Fundamental Agreement
between the Holy See and Israel falls under this latter group, this Article
will focus on these broader conventions.
II. FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH AND COOPERATION WITH THE STATE IN
CONVENTIONS SINCE THE VATICAN II COUNCIL

The Vatican II Council documents define the relationship between the
Church and states in terms of reciprocal independence and autonomy on
the one hand and cooperation on the other Since the Vatican II Council, however, these concepts have been translated into different forms in
the conventions.
A. European Conventions
The affirmation of the reciprocal independence of the Church and
states and the consequent necessity of their mutual cooperation is a
clearly identifiable theme in these conventions. This trend began with
the Spanish Agreement of 1976 and continued with subsequent refinement, through conventions with Italy, Poland, and Croatia.
mento de Ratificaci6n de 4 de diciembre de 1979, Acuerdo Sobre Asuntos Econ6micos, de
3 de enero de 1979 (B.O.E. 1979, 300) [Accord Between Spain and the Holy See Concerning Economic Matters]; Instrumento de Ratificaci6n de 4 de diciembre de 1979,
Acuerdo Entre el Estado Espafiol y la Santa Sede, Sobre Asuntos Jurfdicos, de 3 de enero
de 1979 (B.O.E. 1979, 300) [Accord Between Spain and the Holy See Concerning Juridical
Matters]; Instrumento de Ratificaci6n de 4 de diciembre de 1979, Acuerdo Entre el
Estado Espafiol y la Santa Sede, Sobre Ensefianza y Asuntos Culturales, de 3 de enero de
1979 (B.O.E. 1979, 300) [Accord Between Spain and the Holy See Concerning Education
and Cultural Matters]; Instrumento de Ratificaci6n de Espafia al Acuerdo Entre la Santa
Sede y el Estado Espafiol de 28 de julio de 1976 (B.O.E. 1976, 230) [Accord Between
Spain and the Holy See]; Concordat Between the Holy See and the Republic of Colombia,
July 12, 1973, 67 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 421 (1975); Accord Between the Holy See
and Argentina, Jan. 28 1966, 59 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 127 (1967). Additionally, I
refer to conventions with Tunisia (1964) and with Poland (1993), although the Tunisian
Convention was stipulated a year before the conclusion of Vatican II, and the Polish Convention has not yet been ratified by the Polish parliament. See Convention Between the
Holy See and Poland (1993) (unratified convention on file with author); Convention Between the Holy See and the Republic of Tunisia, June 27, 1964, 56 ACTA APOSTOLICAE
SEDIS 917 (1964).
3. See VATICAN II COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES (Dec. 7, 1965), reprinted in
VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS para. 76, at
984-85 (Austin Flannery ed. & Ambrose McNicholl trans., 1975).
The political community and the Church are autonomous and independent of
each other in their own fields. Nevertheless, both are devoted to the personal
vocation of man, though under different titles. This service will redound the
more effectively to the welfare of all insofar as both institutions practice better
cooperation according to the local and prevailing situation.
Id. para. 76, at 984.
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The July 28, 1976 agreement between the Holy See and Spain declares
that:
The Holy See and the Spanish Government ... considering that
the Vatican II Council, in its turn, has established as fundamental principles, to which the relations between the political community and the Church must conform, both the mutual independence of both Parties, in their order, and a healthy cooperation between them ... deem it necessary to regulate with
distinct Agreements the subjects of common interest that, in the
new circumstances which have emerged since the signing of the
Concordat of August 27, 1953 require a new set of regulations.
The above statement is contained in the preamble of the agreement
and regards only the independence of the State and the Church. Moreover, it refers to the principles of the Vatican II Council as the foundation
of this independence. These principles are certainly important to the
Church, but they may not be held in equal regard by the State.
The agreement between the Holy See and Italy of February 18, 1984,
introduced important new elements. It declares that:
The Italian Republic and the Holy See reaffirm that the State
and the Catholic Church are, each in its own order, independent
and sovereign and commit themselves to the full respect of this
principle in their mutual relations and to reciprocal collaboration for the promotion of man and the common good of the
Country
This provision, no longer contained in the preamble of the agreement,
but Article 1, refers to the foundation of the principle of reciprocal independence and sovereignty as being not only the declaration of the Vatican II Council, but also Italian constitutional laws. The provision thus
provides the argument with a broader and more solid foundation.
The concordat with Poland in 1993 and the agreements with Croatia in
1996 continued this trend with just one variation. The term "sovereign,"
which in the Italian case is justified by the mention of the sovereignty of
the Church contained in Article VII of the Constitution,6 is replaced by
the word "autonomous," thus reinstating the language used in the Con-

4. Instrumento de Ratificaci6n de Espafia al Acuerdo Entre la Santa Sede y el
Estado Espafiol de 28 de julio de 1976 (B.O.E. 1976, 230).
5. Agreement to Amend the 1929 Lateran Concordat, Feb. 18, 1984, Holy See-Italy,
art. 1, 24 I.L.M. 1589, 1591 (1985).
6. The Italian Constitution mentions the sovereignty of the Church in Article VII.
See COSTITUZIONE [COST.] art. VII ("The State and the Catholic Church are, each within
its own ambit, independent and sovereign.").
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stitution Gaudium et Spes.7 Apart from this change, the Italian model
has been followed virtually to the letter.8
This brief examination illustrates that the aforesaid principles of the
Vatican II Council, which were adopted to regulate relations between
the Church and the State, have been transposed practically in full into
these conventions. Consequently, this has led to a radical departure
from the formulae used prior to the Vatican II Council. The Spanish
Concordat of 1953 offers a final example by affirming that "the Spanish
State recognizes the Catholic Church's character of a perfect society and
guarantees it the free and full exercise of its spiritual powers and of its
jurisdiction, as well as the free and public exercise of worship." 9
Some experts have pointed out, correctly, in my opinion, that the progression from the pre-Vatican II Council formulae to those in use in the
last thirty years does not imply any alteration in the central nucleus of
ecclesiastical doctrine on relationships with states. In both cases, before
and after the Council, the intention was to claim the original and
autonomous character of the legal system of the Church: 10 to declare that
the Church is a perfect legal society is no different from declaring that it
is an original and autonomous society analogous to those that legal science defines as primary legal systems.
The progression from a formulae centered on the "perfect society"
category to one which hinges on concepts of independence and autonomy has not been unimportant. Under a historical and political profile,
this progression has marked the break with the concordats stipulated, between the two world wars, with the totalitarian German or authoritarian
Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese regimes. It has smoothed the way for
the liberal democracies that have emerged in Europe during the last fifty
years to conclude new conventions with the Catholic Church. The very
substitution, in Spain and Italy, of the term "concordat" with "agreement" also has been adopted to mark this break with the past. In the
field of law, this same progression has made it possible to re-open dialogue with "secular" legal science that the insistence on nineteenth century notions risked rendering impossible.

VATICAN II COUNCIL, supra note 3, para. 76, at 984.
8. See the formal changes in the Accord Between the Holy See and Croatia on Legal Questions, art. 1 (1996) (on file with author), and the Concordat Between the Holy See
and the Republic of Poland, art. 1 (1993) (unratified convention on file with author).
9. Concordat Between the Holy See and Spain, Aug. 27, 1953, art. II, para. 1, 45
ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 625, 626 (1953).
10. See Giorgio Feliciani, Droit Canonique des Relations de l'Eglise Catholique avec
les Etats Depuis 1917, LE SUPPLtMENT, Dec. 1996, at 100-02.
7.
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Indeed, the principles of independence and autonomy of the Church,
and cooperation with the State have been acknowledged without problems in the law of the European States because these same principlesalbeit with different breadth and significance-had already found autonomous citizenship." Various factors were responsible for this development. One is the process of secularization which has influenced the legal
systems of these states and indirectly favored the recognition of the independence of the Catholic Church and of other religious communities.
Additionally, the development of the rights of freedom, extended to
guarantee the Church's collective manifestations and beliefs, has allowed
the guarantees of religious freedom to the individual to be extended to
institutions, thus providing an important support to the principle of the
autonomy of religious confessions. Furthermore, recourse throughout
Europe to a concerted policy between the state and the most important
social organizations, such as trades unions, parties, and pressure groups,
also has created a favorable climate for cooperation between the state
and religious confessions.
The agreements and pacts of various types between certain states, including Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, and in the future probably Portugal, 2 and certain religious organizations-not only the Catholic
Church-are the most evident manifestations of this evolution in European law. The aims of these agreements are to recognize the autonomy
and independence that, by nature, distinguish the religious groups and
then to translate them into state laws in different ways, depending on the
particular characteristics of each religious community.
In particular, as far as the Catholic Church is concerned, the evolution
of the European legal culture has made it possible to transpose the principles expressed in the Vatican II Council documents on the subject of
relations between the Church and states into state law through conventions. In this way, the particular intensity and specificity that characterize the Catholic Church's independence and autonomy have been acknowledged by a state's legal system, without encountering the
difficulties that would probably have emerged had the notion of "perfect
society" been maintained.

11.

See supra note 6 (quoting article VII of the Italian Constitution); see also

GRUNDGESETZ [constitution] [GC art. 137 (F.R.G.) ("Each religious body regulates and

administers its affairs independently within the limits of general laws."); CONSTITUCION
[C.E.] ch. II, § 1, art. 16, para. 3 (Spain) (obligating the public powers to maintain the appropriate "relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other denominations").
12. In Portugal, a government committee presently is examining this solution. See

L'Anteprojecto della Lei da Liberdade Religiosa concluded on March 5, 1997.
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B. The Latin American Conventions
This last conclusion is only partly valid for the Latin American conventions. The agreements and conventions concluded after the Vatican II
Council with Argentina, Colombia, and Peru are in fact significantly different from the European model, and in some cases maintain formulae
that recall the concordats stipulated in Europe between the two world
13
wars.
The Argentinean Agreement of 1966, for example, does not contain
any explicit reference to the principles of independence, autonomy, and
cooperation. However, similar to the Italian Concordat of 1929, it opens
with the statement that "[tihe Argentinean State recognizes and guarantees the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church the free and full exercise of
its spiritual power, the free and public exercise of its worship, and likewise of its jurisdiction in the field of its competence, in order to achieve
its specific ends. ' , 14 Although the preamble references the principles of
the Vatican II Council, the wording still is indebted strongly to classical
ecclesiastical public law and implicitly to the doctrine of the Church as a
"perfect society." 5
With respect to this point of departure, the 1973 concordat with Colombia marks a step forward. After mentioning in the preamble the purpose of assuring a fruitful cooperation 6 between State and Church, the
agreement declares, in Article II, that "[tlhe Catholic Church shall keep
its full freedom and independence from the civil power and consequently
may exercise freely and wholly its spiritual authority and its ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, governing itself and administrating itself according to its own
laws. 1 7 Moreover, Article III confirms that "canon law is independent
from civil law and is not a part of it, but it shall be respected by the
Authorities of the Republic."18 The 1980 agreement with Peru follows
the fundamental lines of this model. For example, the preamble mentions the cooperation between church and state, Article I recognizes the

13.

See Antonio Ingoglia, L'Istituto ConcordatarioNei Paesi Ispano Americani, in 1
201-06 (Valerio

Lo STUDIO DEL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO: ATTUALITA E PROSPETriVE

Tozzi ed., 1997) (discussing these Latin American conventions).
14. Accord Between the Holy See and Argentina, Jan. 28 1966, art. I, 59 ACTA
APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 127,127-28 (1967).
15.

See

RONALD MINNERATH, L'EGLISE ET LES ETATS CONCORDATAIRES (1846-

1981), at 93 (1983). Regarding this agreement, also compare the contributions published
in 3 ANUARIO

ARGENTINO DE DERECHO CANONICO

347 (1996).

16. Concordat Between the Holy See and the Republic of Colombia, July 12, 1973,
preamble, 67 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SED1s 421, 421-22 (1975).

17. Id. art. II, at 422.
18. Id. art. III, at 422.
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full independence and autonomy of the Church, and Article II recognizes
the Church's legal personality of public character) 9
Despite the significant innovations contained in these two texts, the
Latin American conventions diverge from the European models on one
important point: they do not contain any reference to the distinct order
of the Church and of the state. In the absence of this specification, the
very acknowledgement of the independence and autonomy of the
Church could be viewed as a state concession and may lead to the idea of
a sort of self-imposed limitation by the state on its sovereignty. Though
this is more evident in the wording used in Article I of the Argentinean
agreement, it is also valid for the other two conventions. Indeed, in all of
these conventions, recognition of the independence and autonomy of the
Church is disconnected from any premise serving to make such recognition explicit and serving to provide a justification for it; therefore, it is attributable to an act of free self-determination by the state. Instead, in the
European conventions, such recognition is expressed in terms that make
it contingent upon the acknowledgement-as much by the Church as by
the state--of the existence of two distinct orders, spiritual and temporal.
Both church and state admit their own incompetence in the order belonging to the other, with the exception of what regards the development
of the human person and the promotion of the common good which are
explicitly identified as areas of reciprocal cooperation.
This difference probably is attributable to a different degree of evolution within the respective political and legal systems. The democratic
tradition of many Latin American countries has been more fragile. Recall that the Argentinean and Peruvian concordats were concluded with
military governments, and, likewise, the Colombian concordat was concluded while the country was under a state of siege. This has stifled the
development of a legal culture able to set the independence and autonomy of the Church in a context of independence and autonomy extended
to a plurality of social organizations. Additionally, it stifled the interpretation of the notion of "liberates Ecclesiae" as the more intense specification of freedom rights due to organized groups. Proof of this, by the way,
is the absence of pacts with minority religious confessions. In this context, the traditional model, linked to the concept of the Church as "societas perfecta," does not appear to have been completely overcome. In
its turn, the absence of a break of proportions similar to the European
model-where very few concordats were concluded from the middle of

19. See Accord Between the Holy See and the Republic of Peru, July 19, 1980, preamble, 72 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 807, 807 (1980); id. art. I, at 807; id. art. II, at 807.
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the last century until the outbreak of the first world war-has probably
contributed to developing the Latin American model in a more markedly
consistent and linear fashion.
C. Conventions with Islamic Countries
The convention with Morocco, and also the one with Tunisia, which is
referred to below, presents a completely different picture from those discussed so far. It is not difficult to understand why. The convention was
stipulated with a country where the distinction between the spiritual and
temporal orders is extremely weak. Consequently, it cannot supply a sufficient basis for affirming the independence and autonomy of the
Church. This basis must therefore be sought elsewhere and precisely in
the principle of tolerance that, as is declared explicitly in the letter from
King Hassan of Morocco, "characterizes Islam and has always presided
over Our relations between the Moroccan State and the Catholic
Church."2 ° The legal status of the Catholic Church in Morocco is consistent with this premise. It is, at least formally, a status granted by the
King in the exercise of his right of sovereignty,21 and although de facto, it
was defined through negotiations between representatives of the two
parties.
The convention with Tunisia, the most "secular" country of the Islamic
world and a country where the French cultural influence has been
strongest, presents another completely different picture. In a certain
sense, it is a more "Western" one. Yet even in this convention, there is
no room for notions of independence and autonomy of the Church, nor
cooperation with the State. The convention limits itself to declaring that
the government of the Tunisian Republic: "protects the free exercise of
the Catholic religion in Tunisia, ' ' 21 "accepts that the Catholic Church in
Tunisia... provides, in the respect of the general laws of the country, for

20. The convention with Morocco was concluded through an exchange of letters. In
the first letter, the King of Morocco expressed the fundamental principles of the legal
status conceded to the Catholic Church. Letter from King Hassan II of Morocco to Pope
John Paul II, Dec. 30, 1983, 76 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 712 (1984). In the second, the
Pope gave his "agreement that the Church and the Catholics in the Kingdom of Morocco
should conform everything to the rules agreed upon." Letter from Pope John Paul II to
King Hassan II of Morocco, Feb. 5,1984, 76 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 712 (1984).
21. Both King Hassan's letter and Pope John Paul II's reply refer to "le statut ainsi
octroyd A I'Eglise." Letter from Pope John Paul II to King Hassan II of Morocco, Feb. 5,
1984, 76 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 712, 713 (1984); Letter from King Hassan II of Morocco to Pope John Paul II, Dec. 30,1983, 76 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 712, 714 (1984).
22. Convention Between the Holy See and the Republic of Tunisia, June 27, 1964,
art. 1, 56 ACrA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 917, 917 (1964).
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its internal organization," 3 and "shall not hinder the exercise of the spiritual authority of the Prelate of Tunis over the Catholic believers in Tunisia."24 The freedom that the Church enjoys in Tunisia does not flow from
any recognition by the Tunisian State of the original and autonomous
character of the ecclesiastical legal system.25
Considered as a whole, these conventions are not very satisfactory
from the Holy See's point of view. For decades, the Catholic Church
acted in many Islamic countries through the good offices of the colonial
powers, especially France, Italy, and Spain. The era of de-colonization
forced the Catholic Church to act in the first person. In the Western
world, the Church worked within a context of legal and socio-political
categories that it had helped to forge. In the Islamic world, however,
that context did not exist, and, thus, the instrument of the concordat has
revealed evident limitations.
III. BRIEF SUMMARY

From this schematic examination emerges indications that the Vatican
II Council's views on church-state relations have been almost fully acknowledged in the conventions with European countries. In those conventions with Latin American countries, the principles of the independence and autonomy of the Church and cooperation with the state are
likewise affirmed, but with different and perhaps less satisfactory wording. The differences in the political and legal situations of Europe and
Latin America help us to understand why the same principles have not
been translated into an univocal formulae on both continents.
The above examination also shows how these same principles have
been unable to find acknowledgement in the two conventions stipulated
with countries without a Christian tradition. In these nations, either the
traditional Islamic model has prevailed, which is based on the principle
of tolerance (Morocco), or there is a more secular model which is, nonetheless, unwilling to accept the independence and autonomy of the
Church (Tunisia).
Does this conclusion mean that the notions of independence and
autonomy of the Church and of cooperation with the State are not "exportable" to conventions with states with a non-Christian tradition? Is
the process of adaptation to the particular local circumstances contained
in the European and Latin American conventions impossible with such

23.
24.

25.

Id. art. 4, at 918.
Id.
See MINNERATH, supra note 15, at 87.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 47:385

countries? Or, after examining the Fundamental Agreement between
the Holy See and Israel, is a different conclusion possible?
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE
HOLY SEE

Before examining the contents of the Agreement, it is useful to remember that the State of Israel was born from the intersection of two different roots. One is more secular, connected to eighteenth century Zionism and its intention to put an end to the persecution of the Jews by
guaranteeing them a state in which to live. The other is more religious,
based on the idea of the realization of the divine promise to provide a
land to the people elect. These two traditions coexist in the State of Israel, though not without problems. Israel cannot be considered a fully
secular state, though, it is not a confessional state either, because the religious element is intimately connected to the national element." Indeed,
the secular-confessional dialectic, which is of typically Western origin,
may be applied to Israel with difficulty, as from a certain standpoint Israel is to be found half-way between the East and the West. From this
point of view, Israel is a good test case to determine how far the conceptual categories born in the West, with the determining contribution of
Christianity, as in the case of the distinction between spiritual and temporal order, can be applied in countries where this contribution is a minority compared to other cultural traditions-such as the Islamic, or in
the case under discussion here, the Jewish tradition-and where such a
distinction consequently is less established."
This peculiar characteristic of Israel is reflected in the two articles that
are the foundation on which the entire Fundamental Agreement rests,
namely Articles 1 and 3.

26.

See Ariel Rosen-Zvi,

Freedom of Religion: The Israeli Experience, 46

ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 215

(1986) ("The Jewish religion, throughout the generations, has been identified with the
Jewish nation."); see also Claude Klein, Stato, Ebraismo e Confessioni Religiose in Israele,
in IL MEDITERRANEO NEL NOVECENTO: RELIGIONI E STATI 110-25 (Andrea Riccardi
ed., 1994) (discussing the debated question of the religious qualification of the Israeli
state).
27. Cf Rosen-Zvi, supra note 26, at 215 ("The Jewish national tradition, as opposed
to the tradition of the Christian peoples, desists from giving to Caesar what belongs to
him: rather, it demands from its adherents to give to the religion their all.").
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V. ARTICLE 1 OF THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT

Article 1 obligates both parties to uphold "the human right to freedom
of religion and conscience.''' This is a new wording that does not appear
with the same breadth of meaning in the other conventions with the Holy
See. References to the right to religious freedom are not absent in other
conventions, but normally these references serve to reaffirm the principle
of the independence and autonomy of the Church, which is usually stated
in a more specific form, or they regard the exercise of specific rights for
example, the right of parents to educate their children. 29 There is not
otherwise a general commitment with respect to religious freedom, which
is instead found in Article 1 of the Fundamental Agreement. It is therefore necessary to assess carefully the causes and scope of this innovation.3 °
28. Fundamental Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1, para. 1, at 154.
29. Freedom of religion is referred to in the preambles of the agreements with Spain
(1976), Italy, Croatia, and the Polish Concordat, but these references do not have any further developments in the text of the agreements unless it is to reaffirm the principle of the
freedom of the Church which is already included in that of independence and autonomy.
See Accord Between the Holy See and Croatia on Legal Questions, preamble (1996) (on
file with author); Convention Between the Holy See and Poland, preamble (1993) (unratified convention on file with author); Agreement to Amend the 1929 Lateran Concordat,
Feb. 18, 1984, Italy-Holy See, preamble, 24 I.L.M. 1589, 1589 (1985); Instrumento de Ratificaci6n de Espafia al Acuerdo, Entre la Santa Sede y el Estado Espafiol de 28 de julio de
1976, preamble (B.O.E. 1976, 230). In this sense, for example, Article 4 of the Agreement
with Croatia on legal questions declares: "In the respect of the right to religious freedom,
the Republic of Croatia recognises to the Catholic Church, and to its communities of any
rite, the free exercise of its apostolic mission, in particular with regard to divine worship,
government, teaching and the activity of the associations disciplined in Art. 14." Accord
Between the Holy See and Croatia on Legal Questions, art. 4 (1996) (on file with author).
In other cases, the same reference to the freedom of religion has the function to point out
the scope of specific provisions. For an example of this, see the Agreement with Croatia
on cooperation in the fields of education and culture: "The Republic of Croatia, in the
light of the principle of religious freedom, respects the fundamental rights of parents to
the religious education of their children." See Accord Between the Holy See and Croatia
on Legal Questions, art. 1 (1996) (on file with author). Article 12 provides:
On account of the service that the Catholic Church provides to society, and in respect of religious freedom, the Republic of Croatia allows the Church to have
suitable access to the State means of social communication, in particular to the
radio and to the television ....
In respect of the principles of religious freedom in
a pluralist society, the Republic of Croatia shall vigil with consistency so that in
the means of social communication the feelings of Catholics shall be respected,
and likewise the fundamental human rights, of ethical and religious order.
Id. art. 12.
30. Cf Natan Lerner, The 1992 UN Declarationon Minorities, 23 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM.
RTs. 111, 111-24 (1993) (stressing the utility of the conventions stipulated between states
and religious confessions to reinforce the protection of religious freedom, and integrating
the provisions, which are not always satisfactory, contained in these conventions into the
instruments of international law).
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With respect to the causes, the request to insert a clause guaranteeing
the freedom of religion and of conscience in the Fundamental Agreement appears to have been put forward by the Holy See during the negotiations.31 It is possible that the Holy See was concerned with protecting
the Israeli-Catholic community, a small minority (principally composed
of Arabs) of the Israeli population, from possible discrimination. The Israeli government, sensitive to these issues due to the historical experience of the Jewish people, raised no objections. This was also due to the
fact that the reference to religious freedom served to give a solid basis to
a commitment
which Israel holds particularly dear, namely fighting anti2
Semitism.
The commitment to uphold religious freedom made in Article 1 of the
Fundamental Agreement goes beyond these important but contingent
motives. From the Holy See's point of view, it appears as the first full
realization in concordat law of the Vatican II Council's declaration, Dignitatis Humanae, which states that every "human person has a right to
religious freedom" and requires this right to be "given such recognition
... as will make it a civil right."33 In this document, the right to religious
freedom is conceived as a natural right. In other words, every person has
the right to religious freedom simply because he or she is a human being.
This principle is expressed in Article 1 with the formula "human right to
freedom of religion and conscience," 4 which is more consonant to the
language of international law. In any case, this "absolute" nature of the
right to religious freedom involves a legal obligation of general scope.
The Catholic Church and the State of Israel committed themselves to
upholding religious freedom not only of their own believers and citizens,
but also those of any other entity. The rights and freedoms recognized
by the Catholic Church must not become the reason for even indirect
limitations on the rights and freedoms of other individuals and groups.
Examining the letter of the law, the commitments undertaken by the
two parties in Article 1 of the Agreement are not identical, either in content or scope. With respect to content, Israel agrees to "uphold and observe" the right to religious freedom, while the Catholic Church is bound

31. See Lorenzo Cremonesi, Le Tappe del Negoziato Diplomatico, QUADERNI DI
DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA, Apr. 1995, at 165.
32. See Fundamental Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2, at 155 (providing a commitment to combat anti-semitism).
33. VATICAN II COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE (Dec, 7 1965), reprinted in
VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILAR AND POST CONCILAR DOCUMENTS 799, 800
(Austin Flannery ed. & Laurence Ryan trans., 1975).
34. Fundamental Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1, at 154.
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only to "uphold" religious freedom.35 The different nature of the two
subjects probably explains the disparity of their obligations. The Catholic Church must promote the right to religious freedom, but it is not
obliged to observe the same if this means, for example, "to accept that,
within itself, other faiths are embraced by its believers even if they are
different from its own and that different rites from its own are celebrated."36 With regard to scope, the Agreement refers to the international conventions signed by Israel and the Holy See to determine the
rights to religious freedom that the parties agree to honor. This reference confers a different scope to the obligation assumed by the two parties. In particular, Israel (but not the Holy See) signed the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Agreement
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICCPR) which contain important provisions on the subject of freedom of religion.37
Article 1 binds the parties to respect the human right to religious freedom." This explicit qualification of religious freedom as a human right,
the significance of which has already been seen in relation to the Vatican
II Council's documents, fulfills various functions. First, this Article
should be considered in the context of Israel's legal tradition that, in the
absence of a written constitution, has broadly utilized the international
conventions on human rights to make up for the absence of a law on religious freedom at the constitutional level.39 The reference to human
rights contained in Article 1, moreover, serves to stress the importance of
the right to religious freedom and, finally, to place its interpretation in
the light of what has been acquired during the last fifty years, in terms of
doctrine and jurisprudence, on the subject of human rights.
These acquisitions tend to highlight a dual dimension-individual and
collective-of the right to religious freedom. In the individual dimen35. Id.
36. Tullio Scovazzi, L'Accordo Fondamentale tra la Santa Sede e Jsraele: Aspetti di
Diritto Internazionale dei Trattati, QUADERNI Di DIRITrO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA,
Apr. 1995, at 163.
37. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 18,
para. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 13, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8; see also Scovazzi, supra note 36, at 161-62. On the other hand, Article 1 of the Fundamental Agreement contains a declaration to respect "other religions and their followers," which is binding only
for the Holy See. Fundamental Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1, para. 2, at 154.
38. See Fundamental Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1, at 154.
39. See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 26, at 219-20; Shimon Shetreet, Some Reflections on
Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Israel, 4 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 194, 196 (1974);
see also Eyal Benvenisti, The Influence of InternationalHuman Rights Law on the Israeli
Legal System: Presentand Future, 28 ISR. L. REV. 136-53 (1994).
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sion, the right to religious freedom is substantiated through a series of
rights belonging to each human being. The common reference, as much
by the Holy See as by Israel, to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights supplies an initial catalogue of these rights, including the individual right to change one's religion"° which has not been reaffirmed explicitly in all subsequent international instruments. It is possible to develop
this catalogue through reference to the other conventions to which Israel
and the Holy See are parties.
The group dimension of the right to religious freedom does not find
such an explicit reference in the provisions of international law. However, the nearly unanimous opinion of the doctrine 4' and, more timidly,
the jurisprudence of the international bodies,42 has stressed the need to
recognize entitlement to the right to religious freedom not only as to individuals, but also as to communities. The observation that often "individuals are discriminated against because of their membership in some
specific group, 43 created a broad consensus for the proposal to draft "a
more general notion of rights inherent to the condition of some specific
and well defined groups,"" among which the religious communities maintain an important position. From this perspective, it is easy to see the increasing intersections between the reflections of the most recent international doctrine and the principles of the freedom due to the religious
communities as set out in the Vatican II Council documents: the catalogue of the freedoms that are the competence of the religious communities, as written in the declaration Dignitatis humanae, is substantially
identical to the one that lawyers draw from the international provisions
protecting religious freedom.45
A closer examination of the contents of Article 1 of the Fundamental
Agreement, from the point of view of group rights to religious freedom,
reveals that here, too, the obligations assumed by the parties are not
40. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 18, G.A. Res. 217
A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
41. See Yoram Dinstein, Freedom of Religion and the Protection of Religious Minorities, 20 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 155, 178 (1990); Alessandro Pizzorusso, Libertd Religiosa
e Confessioni di Minoranza, QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA, Apr.
1997, at 49.
42. On the evolution in this direction of the jurisprudence of the European Commission on Human Rights, see Javier Martinez Torrfn, La Giurisprudenza degli Organi di
Strasburgo sulla Libertd Religiosa, in 1 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DE1 DIRIITI
DELL'UOMO 338-39 (1993).
43.

NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 169 (1991).
44. Id. at 17.
45. See id. at 80-84.
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identical. For instance, Israel, which is party to the ICCPR, is bound to
respect Article 27 thereunder which provides that "[i]n those States in
which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their own language. '4 6 The Catholic
population in Israel certainly qualifies as a religious minority.17 As such,
the Holy See could, if necessary, ask that this provision be respected. Its
scope, according to prevailing doctrine, encompasses not only the "collective human rights of religious minorities ... to found and operate the
communal institutions required for the perpetuation of the minority's religion," 48 but also the cultural dimension connected to the religious experience. Indeed, authoritative experts maintain that "even when we consider a strictly religious minority-namely, a group differing from the
majority only in its religious belief, or Catholics in England we must not
lose sight of the link between religion and culture., 49 The reference in
Article 27 of the ICCPR "to the right 'to enjoy their own culture' may be
interpreted to apply not only to ethnic minorities, but also to religious
minorities."5 °
With respect to this picture defined by the reference to the "human
right to freedom of religion and conscience,""1 the character of many of
the provisions contained in the Fundamental Agreement is essentially
one of integration and specification. For instance, the commitment undertaken by Israel and the Holy See to "respect the 'Status quo' in the
Christian Holy Places to which it applies and the respective rights of the
Christian communities thereunder 5' 2 is a particular application of the
right to observe and practice one's own religion, which is guaranteed by

46. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 27, at 179.
47. See Dinstein, supra note 41, at 164-70 (discussing the characteristics of religious
minorities).
48. Id. at 168.
49. Id. at 169.
50. Id. Moreover, this provision should be interpreted broadly, consistent with Article 1 of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Natural or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, which ensures: "States shall protect the existence and the
national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity."
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, art. 1, para. 1, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item
97(b), at 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1993); see also Lerner, supra note 30, at 111-24.
51. Fundamental Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1, para. 1, at 154.
52. Id. art. 4, para. 1, at 155.
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Article 18 of the ICCPR 3 Article 6, which reaffirms "the right of the
Catholic Church to establish, maintain and direct schools and institutes
of study at all levels, 54 is a development and specification of Article 13
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
These two provisions, together with Article 8" and Article 10 of the Fundamental Agreement, also may be considered specifications of Article 27
of the ICCPR.
Article 1 of the Fundamental Agreement therefore seems to have dual
functions. On the one hand, it binds the parties to a series of obligations
which may be defined summarily by the expression "human right to
freedom of religion and conscience,"5 6 and more analytically identified
through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the other international conventions already mentioned. It, however, supplies the context in which the subsequent provisions of the Agreement are to be set
forth and interpreted. Indeed, these provisions interact in several respects with the provisions contained in the international instruments on
human rights. For example, Article 6 of the Fundamental Agreement
declares the right of the Catholic Church in Israel to "establish, maintain
and direct schools and institutes of study at all levels; this right being exercised in harmony with the rights of the State in the field of education."57 This provision might be read, forcing its interpretation a little, in
the sense that the right of the Catholic Church to establish schools remains subordinate to the existence of a state law that provides for this
possibility. However, Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights declares "the liberty of parents ...to
choose for their children schools, other than those established by the
public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State .... ,58 This provision obligates the state to provide for the possibility of creating private
schools--otherwise the right of the parents would be frustrated-and
53. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 18, at 178.
54. Fundamental Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6, at 156.
55. Article 8 of the Fundamental Agreement affirms that the "right of the Catholic
Church to freedom of expression in the carrying out of its functions is exercised also
through the Church's own communications media." Id. art. 8, at 156.
56. Id. art. 1, at 154. The utility of the conventions stipulated between the Holy See
and states, considered "alternative ways of action" compared to the "global and regional
instruments" existing in this sector, to reinforce the protection of the right to religious
freedom is stressed by Natan Lerner, The Holy See and Israel: ProtectingReligious Human
Rights by BilateralAgreements (in press in Anuario de Derecho Eclesiastico del Estado).
57. Fundamental Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6, at 156.
58. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 37,
art. 13(3), at 8.
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limits its power to the determination of the educational requirements to
which these schools must conform. 9
VI. ARTICLE

3 OF THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT

The recognition of "group rights" or "community rights" referred to in
the previous paragraph raises several delicate issues. One is that not all
groups are equal and, therefore, all groups are not entitled to the same
rights. It is at this point that, in my opinion, the connection between Article 1 and Article 3 of the Fundamental Agreement resides. Until now,
we have discussed only the sphere of Article 1, which establishes a common platform for the rights, not only of individuals, but also of religious
communities. Article 3 specifies these rights in relation to a particular
community, the Catholic Church.
The first commentators of the Fundamental Agreement did not devote60
much attention to Article 3, which was mainly read in light of Article 1.
The legal status of the Catholic Church in Israel, as defined in Article 3,
would therefore find its foundation in the commitment to respect religious freedom assumed by the State of Israel in Article 1 of the Agreement. More precisely, it would be a consequence of the collective right
to religious freedom due to the members of the Church itself. This interpretation, although confirmed in the conclusions reached by the part of
canon law doctrine reflecting on the relations between religious freedom
and libertas Ecclesiae,6' does not appear to be supported by Article 3 of
the Fundamental Agreement.
It is well known that the status of the Catholic Church in Israel was
one of the thorniest points of the negotiations. The Israeli Government,
following the United States model, tended to consider ecclesiastical organizations in the broader category of non-profit organizations. Moreover, they were willing to recognize the legal personality of only single
church institutions, but not the Catholic Church as such. Instead, the
delegates of the Holy See asked that the Catholic Church be granted an
independent legal personality. 62 Important practical consequences were

59. See Yoram Dinstein, CulturalRights, 9 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 58, 68-73 (1979).
60. See David Maria A. Jaeger, In Margine all' "Accordo Fondamentale" tra la Santa
Sede e lo Stato di Israele, in LA PORTA D'ORIENTE 21 (1995); Francesco Lozupone, Stato e
Confessioni Religiose in Israele, in MINORANZE, LAICITA, FAT7ORE RELIGIOsO 198 (R.

Coppola & L. Troccoli eds., 1997).
61. See 19 LuIGI MISTO, "LIBERTAS RELIGIOSA" AND "LIBERTAS ECCLESIAE": IL
FONDAMENTO DELLA RELAZIONE CHIESA-COMUNITA POLITICA NEL QUADRO DEL
DIBATrITO POSTCONCILIARE IN ITALIA 179-87 (1982).

62.

See Cremonesi, supra note 31, at 177-81.
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at stake, though it was above all a clash between two antithetical legal
concepts that are the fruit of two distinct cultural traditions.
Article 3 of the Fundamental Agreement is the result of this clash, and
it can be considered from two angles: structural and linguistic. From the
structural angle, an analogy emerges with the European conventions 3
since the Vatican II Council, examined above: the identification of two
distinct orders-the "respective rights and powers" ' that depend on the
Holy See and Israel-the independence and autonomy of each of the
parties in their respective orders-where it is stated that both parties
"are free in the exercise of their respective rights and powers" 65-and the
commitment to "co-operation for the good of the people." 66 The second
paragraph of Article 3 further specifies the principle of distinction between the orders, delimiting them by indicating the functions belonging
to one sphere or the other. Specifically, the "religious, moral, educational and charitable functions" are delegated to the Church's authority,
while "functions such as promoting and protecting the welfare and the
safety of the people, 67 are delegated to the State. The second paragraph
of Article 3 reaffirms the autonomy of the Church in regulating its own
internal organization and in carrying out the activities connected to the
functions that are recognized as its own. The Church retains the right "to
have its own institutions, and to train, appoint and deploy its own per68
sonnel in the said institutions or for the said functions to these ends.,
From this angle, the Fundamental Agreement is far more comparable to
the European conventions than to those between the Holy See and Morocco or Tunisia.
If the structure of Article 3 closely follows that of the corresponding
articles of the European conventions, from the language angle it is certainly different. The terms "autonomous" and "independent" have been
replaced by the word "free," and whereas the European Conventions
63. An analogy with Article 1 of the Italian Agreement (which on this point is substantially identical, as we have seen, to the other European conventions) has been picked
up by Francesco Margiotta Broglio, L'Accordo "Fondamentale"tra la Santa Sede e lo Stato
d'Israele(30 Dicembre 1993), in NUOVA ANTOLOGIA, Apr.-June 1994, at 157.
64. Fundamental Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3, para. 1, at 155.
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 3, para. 1, at 155. An application of this principle may be found in Article
11 of the Fundamental Agreement, where the Holy See declares that "owing to its own
character, it is solemnly committed to remaining a stranger to all merely temporal conflicts." Id. art. 11, para. 2, at 157. The extraneousness of the Holy See to temporal questions is affirmed on account of the nature itself of the Holy See, which presupposes the
existence of an order to which the Holy See is by its very nature extraneous.
67. Id. art 3, para. 2, at 155.
68. Id.
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employ the term "own order" in referring to state and church, Article 3
incorporates the phrase "respective rights and powers."69 This difference
in language may be explained in two ways. First, the spiritual-secular distinction is less important in the Jewish tradition, and it is therefore difficult to theorize about the distinction of an order of the Church and an
order of the State. Second, the common law tradition, in particular the
North American tradition, has exercised and continues to exercise influence on the Israeli legal culture, which has inherited the Anglo-Saxon
lawyers' wariness of wording based on general and abstract concepts,
namely, independence and autonomy, and the preference for concrete
and pragmatic solutions founded on the recognition of rights and powers
to specific subjects.
In any case, to understand correctly the legal position of the Catholic
Church within the Israeli legal system, it appears to me that the last
paragraph of Article 3 is decisive. Article 3 states that "[c]onceming
Catholic legal personality at canon law the Holy See and the State of Israel will negotiate on giving it full effect in Israeli law., 70 Although the
expression "Catholic legal personality at canon law" is not totally selfevident, the meaning of the provision is sufficiently clear. The commitment by Israel and the Holy See to carry out negotiations does not simply regard the attribution of legal personality, meaning "any" form of legal personality, to the Catholic Church and its organizations, but it also
regards the attribution of full effect in Israeli law to legal personality as it
is recognized by canon law. The code of canon law clearly states that: (1)
the Church, as such, enjoys legal personality, and that (2) such personality is enjoyed "ex ipsa ordinatione divina." First, under this construction
the legal personality of the Catholic Church can neither be confused with
nor exhausted in the legal personalities of other organizations that are a
part of the Church. Second, the legal personality of the Church derives
from an original source, and does not depend in any way upon the State.
The characteristics of originality and independence are constitutive parts
of the notion of legal personality articulated under canon law. Consequently, these same characteristics of legal personality must be mirrored
in the form of legal personality that will be granted to the Church under
Israeli law. 7' Therefore, Article 3 of the Fundamental Agreement is an

69. Id. art. 3, para. 1, at 155.
70. Id. art. 3, para. 3, at 155.
71. 1983 CODE c.113, § 1 (providing that the Church's legal personality is enjoyed "ex
ipsa ordinationedivina"). Other canons define the prerogatives of the Church by emphasizing their original character. See id. c.129, § 1 ("potestas regiminis ... ex divina institutione est in Ecclesia"); id c.747, § 1 ("Ecclesiae ...officium est et ius nativum . . .a
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autonomous base, independent of Article 1, and competing with it for
the legal status of the Church under Israeli law.
VII. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH IN THE
FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT

The remarks made in the two previous paragraphs allow us to reach a
conclusion which, starting with the Fundamental Agreement, regards
more general relations between the state and religious communities. The
commitment to respect the collective right to religious freedom is a legal
platform valid for all religious communities. Consequently, religious
communities can enjoy a series of rights, ranging from organizing themselves autonomously to teaching their doctrine freely, which the state is
obliged to guarantee.
From this common platform it is possible to further specify the rights
due to the religious communities by means of bilateral agreements between the state and these communities. This is what has happened in
many European countries, as we have seen. These further specifications
integrate the general law, which derives from the right to religious freedom by adapting it to the peculiar characteristics of each religious community.
With respect to the Fundamental Agreement, Article 1 supplies the
common platform. Thereafter, Article 3 and, in relation to more specific
sectors, Articles 6, 8, 9, and 10 adapt and integrate Article 1 to mold it to
the requirements of the Catholic Church, just as a different agreement
might do for the requirements of another religious confession.
Generally, this system suitably protects both individual and group religious freedom, as long as two conditions are respected. First, the specification of rights to religious freedom through agreements does not contradict the common platform guaranteed to individuals and groups by the
human right to religious freedom. Second, there should be correspondence between the agreements of the different religious communities
and between these agreements as a whole and the unilateral state discipline of the religious communities that have not stipulated agreements,
to avoid inequality which could adversely impact religious freedom. The
"equal freedom 7 2 of all religious communities, with or without agreements with the state, is the insuperable limit of any agreement system.

qualibet humana potestate independens, omnibus gentibus Evangelium praedicandi").
72. In this perspective, it is useful to remember the first comma of Article VIII of the
Italian Constitution, even if its potential does not appear to be fully exploited: "[a]ll religious denominations are equally free before the law." COSTITUZIONE [CoST.] art. VIII.
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VIII. THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT AS A MODEL FOR
CONVENTIONS WITH NON-CHRISTIAN COUNTRIES?

The Fundamental Agreement undoubtedly marks an important step
forward as compared to the other conventions concluded with nonChristian countries. In this context, three elements are particularly worthy of consideration. First, the right to religious freedom is a fundamental meeting point and an important point of departure for cooperation
between the Catholic Church and states. The Vatican II Council delineates "the right to religious freedom in analogous terms to those of modern legal doctrine, for which it takes shape as a subjective, individual and
collective public right. ' ' 73 The Fundamental Agreement, however, with
its reference to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, allows us to
broaden this intersection from the structure of the right to religious freedom to its contents, identifying a catalogue of rights that both the Church
and the state undertake to support. The Catholic Church's interest in
obtaining, especially in countries where it is a minority religion, precise
guarantees of religious autonomy and freedom, could coincide with the
interests of states. Even where states are not spontaneously inclined to
protect rights to religious freedom, they may have a measurable interest
in demonstrating to the international community their respect for one of
the fundamental human rights. As such, the reciprocal commitment to
develop the rights to religious freedom could be the starting point of a
policy of agreements extended to states, which have so far remained ex74
traneous.
Second, the Fundamental Agreement demonstrates that it is possible
to translate the principles of the independence and autonomy of the
Church and of the distinct orders of the state and of the Church into legal
categories unrelated to the Western legal tradition-this was unsuccessful in the conventions with Morocco and Tunisia. It is an inevitable step
if we do not wish to limit the field of application of the conventions between the Church and states to countries with a Christian tradition. The
Fundamental Agreement hinges on the freedom of the Church and of
the state in the exercise of their respective rights and powers. It is a formulae that could be used in very different legal systems, provided we
succeed in clarifying the margin of ambiguity which still may be inherent
in it.

73.

GIUSEPPE DALLA TORRE, LA CITrA SUL MONTE 79 (1996).

74. Naturally, this is not possible with everybody, nor with everybody in the same
way. Rights to religious freedom could turn out to be infertile ground, for example, for
starting concordat relations with Islamic countries.
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Finally, the importance of the human rights provision within the Fundamental Agreement must not be underestimated. This provision may
be most useful in countries with no written constitution, such as in Israel,
or where the constitution does not adequately protect religious freedom.
In this case, the guarantees provided by international law on human
rights are an alternative route which may compensate for the absence of
similarly strong human rights guarantees in the internal law of a state.
It is too early to know for certain whether the Fundamental Agreement is a model that can be exported anywhere. For now, it is safe to say
that the Fundamental Agreement provides some very interesting starting
points for the development of a system of relationships based on agreements with states that do not belong to the cultural area of Christian tradition.

